By: Abigail Clarke

On September 29, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed an antitrust class action against Fanatics, Inc. (“Fanatics”), Major League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), the National Football League (“NFL”), and their respective players’ associations.[1]

In 2021, Fanatics entered the professional sports trading card industry and obtained exclusive trading card licenses from MLB, NBA, NFL, Formula 1, the Premier League, UFC, WWE, and more.[2] Additionally, Fanatics acquired Topps, a rival card manufacturer, and a controlling interest in GC Packaging, the primary manufacturer for Fanatics’ largest competitor.[3] The plaintiffs alleged that Fanatics’ exclusive licensing agreements and increased control over manufacturing reduced competition, restricted consumer choice, increased prices, and lowered product quality.[4]

Under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, plaintiffs brought a thirteen-count action alleging that Fanatics attempted to unlawfully monopolize the professional sports trading card market.[5] However, the court did not decide whether Fanatics’ conduct violated antitrust laws because it found that the plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing.[6] Each plaintiff has to establish a “case or controversy between himself and the defendant” to satisfy Article III.[7] The court emphasized that allegations of market-wide anticompetitive effects and speculative injury were insufficient without a concrete and particularized injury to each individual plaintiff.[8] In this case, the plaintiffs could not identify the specific trading cards they purchased, the prices they paid, or facts connecting their purchases to specific anticompetitive conduct by Fanatics.[9]

Separately, Panini, a direct competitor of Fanatics, alleges that Fanatics has monopoly power over the relevant market and is using it to set prices and exclude competitors.[10] Panini claims that Fanatics’ exclusive licensing agreements with major sports leagues and players’ associations would give it control of 100% of the market in 2026.[11] Additionally, Panini alleges Fanatics used the growing market power to disadvantage and influence other market participants.[12] Beyond market power, Panini challenged the acquisition of GC Packaging, which produced over 90% of Panini’s U.S. trading cards.[13] According to the complaint, after the acquisition Fanatics disrupted Panini’s production and created a shortfall of over 100 million trading card packs.[14] The court ruled that Panini had adequately pleaded antitrust standing for several of its claims and allowed the case to proceed.[15] Unlike the consumers in Jones alleging harm across the entire market, Panini identified direct injury to its business caused by challenged exclusionary conduct.[16]

However, the court did not allow every claim Panini brought to proceed.[17] It dismissed Panini’s challenge to Fanatics acquisition of Topps, a previous competitor, for lack of standing because there was no particularized injury caused by that specific transaction.[18] The court reasoned that Panini could itself benefit from reduced competition resulting from the acquisition as one of the remaining competitors and that the alleged injuries were not sufficiently connected.[19] This distinction illustrates that standing must be considered on a claim-by-claim basis.[20]

Together, Jones and Panini demonstrate the importance of the relationship between the plaintiff, the alleged anticompetitive conduct, and the resulting injury.[21] Antitrust concerns often involve market-wide effects, such as higher prices, fewer choices, or barriers to entry, but plaintiffs must be able to show a sufficient injury and connection to the alleged anticompetitive conduct before the court will assess the merits of their claims.[22] In Jones, consumers failed to connect the alleged market-wide effects to their own purchases.[23] Panini was able to pass the Article III threshold by identifying direct injury to its business and the relevant market which was plausibly caused by Fanatics’ alleged conduct.[24] These cases highlight how allegations of anticompetitive conduct are not enough by themselves and plaintiffs must be able to satisfy fact specific standing requirements connecting alleged injury to conduct.[25]

This may become increasingly important as professional sports leagues and players’ associations rely on exclusive licensing agreements to monetize their intellectual property.[26] For trading card manufacturers, exclusive licenses can provide valuable access to leagues, teams, and players.[27] For leagues and players’ associations, exclusive agreements are an important way to commercialize intellectual property and name, image, and likeness rights.[28] The Jones and Panini litigation underscores that the structure and competitive effects of these arrangements may attract antitrust scrutiny.[29] Although the decisions have not yet resolved the legality of Fanatics’ licensing strategy, they show why manufacturers and licensing partners must assess the financial terms, competitive effects, and business considerations of an exclusive agreement.[30] Future exclusive licensing deals may therefore require leagues and players’ associations to look beyond the financial and business terms of an agreement and consider potential antitrust risks.[31]

 

[1] Jones v. Fanatics, Inc., No. 1:25-CV-05776, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221796, at *1, *5–7 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2026).

[2] Larry Holder, Three Antitrust Suits Against Fanatics Dismissed: ‘We Will Not Be Shaken Down’, The Athletic (Sep. 30, 2026), http://nytimes.com/athletic/7647024/2026/09/30/fanatics-antitrust-lawsuits-topps-trading-cards/ (on file with the American University Business Law Review) .

[3] See id. at *9–10; Eben Novy-Williams, Fanatics-Panini Battle Hinges on $100M Buy into Texas Card Printer, Yahoo! Sports: Sportico (Aug. 10, 2023), https://sports.yahoo.com/fanatics-panini-battle-hinges-100m-142916744.html [https://perma.cc/QN99-ZNKC].

[4] See Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221796, at *13–14.

[5] See id. at *6–7; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (prohibiting anticompetitive agreements that restrain trade and the abuse of monopoly power); 15 U.S.C §§ 12–27 (prohibiting business practices that “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”).

[6] Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221796, at *31–32.

[7] Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).

[8] Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221796, at *22, *31.

[9] See id. at *12–13, *29–30; Eben Novy-Williams & Michael McCann, Fanatics Beats Back Trio of Lawsuits Alleging Monopoly Practices, Sportico (Sep. 30, 2026, at 14:50 ET), https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2026/fanatics-legal-wins-antitrust-monopoly-lawsuits-1234946281/ (on file with the American University Business Law Review).

[10] Panini Am., Inc. v. Fanatics, Inc., No. 23-CV-9714, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42143, at *15–17. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2025).

[11] Id. at *5.

[12] Id. at *7–9.

[13] Id. at *6–7.

[14] Id. at *7.

[15] Id. at *11–12, *32–33, *50–51; Holder, supra note 2 (stating the case is currently in discovery and Fanatics does not anticipate going to trial until 2030).

[16] Panini, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42143, at *19–21.

[17] Id. at *12–13, *50–51.

[18] Id. at *12–13.

[19] Id.

[20] Id. at *10–11.

[21] Compare Jones v. Fanatics, Inc., No. 1:25-CV-05776, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221796, at *22, *29–31 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2026) (rejecting consumer claims of anticompetitive harm for lack of Article III standing), with Panini, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42143, at *18–21, *32–33 (accepting most competitor allegations of monopolization and anticompetitive harm because demonstrable specific connection between harm and conduct).

[22] See The Antitrust Laws, U.S. Dep’t of Just.: Antitrust Div. (Dec. 20, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-laws-and-you  (on file with the American University Business Law Review); Panini, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42143, at *18–21.

[23] Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221796, at *29–30.

[24] Panini, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42143, at *18–21.

[25] See Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221796, at *22, *29–31; Panini, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42143, at *18–21.

[26] See Sabria McElroy & Savannah Mora, Antitrust and Sports: Legal Framework and Evolving Landscape, Boies Schiller Flexner (Aug. 21, 2025), https://www.bsfllp.com/news-events/antitrust-and-sports-legal-framework-and-evolving-landscape.html [https://perma.cc/9C5V-NLHD].

[27] See A Word About Trading Card Licensing…, Instant Replay Sports Cards (Aug. 7, 2026), https://instantreplaysportscards.com/f/a-word-about-trading-card-licensing [https://perma.cc/U5C4-MFQ3].

[28] Dana S. Gross & Doneld G. Shelkey, Zooming In: The IP Infrastructure Behind the Business of Sports, Morgan Lewis (Apr. 20, 2026), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2026/04/zooming-in-the-ip-infrastructure-behind-the-business-of-sports [https://perma.cc/DG33-VFWJ].

[29] See Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221796, at *9–12; Panini, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42143, at *5–9.

[30] See Panini, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42143, at *15–17, *32–33.

[31] See Exclusive Dealing or Requirements Contracts, Fed. Trade Comm’n,  https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-supply-chain/exclusive-dealing-or-requirements-contracts (on file with the American University Business Law Review) (last visited Oct. 17, 2026).