By: Audrey May Lucas

After unsuccessful negotiations between the United States Department of War (“DoW”) and Anthropic, President Donald Trump directed all federal agencies to stop using Anthropic’s artificial intelligence models.[1] Secretary of War Pete Hegseth joined the President’s directive, designating the company a “supply chain risk” and a risk to national security under both 10 U.S.C. § 3252 and 41 U.S.C. § 4713.[2] Anthropic and the DoW clashed in negotiations on the company’s acceptable use policy, prohibiting their model, Claude, from being used in mass domestic surveillance of Americans and in fully autonomous weapons systems.[3] Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei asserts the acceptable use policy applies only where Claude is inadequate for unrestricted deployment, not to usurp military operations.[4] Both the Northern District of California and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled on the dispute.[5] Conflicting interpretations of 10 U.S.C. § 3252 and 41 U.S.C. § 4713 create uncertainty for government contractors because § 4713 reaches any vendor whose product “any person” could manipulate without adversarial intent.[6] This creates an opening for a broader path to exclusion with the D.C. Circuit’s approval.[7]

The Northern District of California found that both the Presidential and DoW directives violated the First Amendment, reasoning that Anthropic met its burden by establishing that the company engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the action would ‘chill a person of ordinary firmness’ from continued engagement, and the protected activity was a substantial motivator for the defendant.[8] Qualifying Anthropic’s public comments as protected under the First Amendment provides some insulation going forward, after the decision identified the comments as a cause for the designation.[9] The directives and supply chain designation materials heavily referenced Anthropic’s public discussions of negotiations with the DoW, citing those media comments as the reason Anthropic deserved a supply chain risk designation because Anthropic attempted to hijack the negotiations for its public relations.[10] Additionally, the court found that the Secretary of Defense is not authorized to exclude a company from providing services to other agencies under 10 U.S.C. § 3252, nor can the Department require defense contractors to cease business with the company; doing so would exceed and contravene the Secretary’s authority.[11]

Alternatively, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered the designation under a different statute, 41 U.S.C. § 4713, enacted under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act (“FASCSA”).[12] The court held that the record strongly supports the Secretary’s conclusion that Claude may be manipulated to inhibit the DoW and risk national security, given that it is undisputed that Anthropic can and does control Claude’s responses.[13] The court rejected Anthropic’s narrow interpretation of FASCSA and relied on statutory-construction principles favoring the government’s authority to address national-security risks.[14] Furthermore, the court held that the definition of “supply chain risk” under 10 U.S.C. § 3252 is narrower than the definition under 41 U.S.C. § 4713.[15] Although the court did not reject the Northern District’s reasoning, it concluded that § 4713 does not require involvement by an “adversary,” only the existence of a broader supply-chain risk.[16] The D.C. Circuit’s broader reading emphasizes that “any person” may sabotage or manipulate covered articles, rather than a specified adversarial opponent.[17] Notably, this reading opens two doors for the DoW to designate a supply chain risk, allowing FASCSA as a backup if the narrow Section 3252 rationale doesn’t stand.[18]

The administration’s use of supply-chain risk to remove companies from doing business with the government is not unprecedented, but it has often been limited to foreign adversaries, such as Huawei, a foreign state-linked company.[19] Anthropic is the first domestic company to be designated under FASCSA for its ethics, not security.[20] Broadening the scope of § 4713 to the U.S. market creates significant risks for defense contractors who may have Anthropic models integrated into their company structure and are seeking business with the administration.[21] Going forward, contractors may have to document their use of Anthropic and the areas of their business it touches.[22] Firms have begun issuing client alerts identifying risks, including potential false certifications from contractors who believe they do not use Anthropic, only to discover later that the certification is incorrect; limited visibility into AI technologies used by suppliers and software vendors; and contractual record risks.[23]

Additionally, the broadened application of § 4713 may affect providers negotiating with the government if technology conflicts with the government’s needs.[24] The D.C. Circuit rejected any requirement that FASCSA itself be limited to hostile or malicious actors, adding uncertainty to contract negotiations with the DoW in the wake of the decision.[25] The D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the “bad motive” requirement may permit the Government to construe standard features such as automatic updates as a supply chain risk.[26] Contractors are entitled to pre-deprivation notice under the FASCSA and an opportunity to respond to the exclusion notice, but after the D.C. Circuit decision allowing retroactive notice of removal, contractors face a more unstable environment with potential for unannounced exclusions.[27] Contractors should review certification requests more closely and anticipate contract modifications in light of the decision, as questions about Claude’s integration and other Anthropic products in contractors’ internal systems remain unanswered.[28]

 

[1] See J. Ryan Frazee, John Prairie & Adam S. Hickey, Pentagon Designates Anthropic a Supply Chain Risk – What Government Contractors Need to Know, Mayer Brown (Mar. 2, 2026), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2026/03/pentagon-designates-anthropic-a-supply-chain-risk-what-government-contractors-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/CL2M-RGX8].

[2] See id. (describing the risks to government contractors); 10 U.S.C. § 3252 (permitting only the military secretaries to take covered procurement action to exclude sources that fail to meet qualification standards or fails to meet an acceptable rating in regard to evaluations on the supply chain risk factors, meaning the risk an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce, or otherwise degrade the function of a covered system); 41 U.S.C. § 4713 (authorizing the head of an executive agency to carry out covered procurement actions to prohibit sources or contractors that are supply chain risks under procedural requirements including obtaining recommendations, providing notice, and conducting reviews); Jackie Manning, Pentagon Can Blacklist Any AI Ethics Policy Under Supply Chain Law FASCSA, Court Rules, Tech Times (Sep. 28, 2026, at 10:50 ET), https://www.techtimes.com/articles/328109/20260928/pentagon-can-blacklist-any-ai-ethics-policy-under-supply-chain-law-fascsa-court-rules.htm [https://perma.cc/ZBK9-Y4LS].

[3] See Frazee, Prairie & Hickey, supra note 1.

[4] See Merin Rebecca Thomas, Pentagon Can Keep Anthropic Out of Its AI Supply Chain, Appeals Court Rules As It Rejects Claude Maker’s Challenge, Int’l Bus. Times (Sep. 25, 2026, at 15:42 ET), https://www.ibtimes.com/pentagon-can-keep-anthropic-out-its-ai-supply-chain-appeals-court-rules-it-rejects-claude-3807909 [https://perma.cc/95K3-GHC3] (commenting on the recent court decisions).

[5] See Anthropic PBC v. United States Dep’t of War, No. 27-1049, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 29435, at *4, *23, * 41 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 25, 2026); Thomas, supra note 4; Heather Somerville & Amrith Ramkumar, Judge Rules Trump Administration’s Blacklisting of Anthropic Was Unlawful, Wall St. J. (Aug. 27, 2026, at 22:39 ET), https://www.wsj.com/us-news/law/judge-rules-trump-administration-violated-anthropics-first-amendment-rights-0c20c442 (on file with the American University Business Law Review); Amrith Ramkumar & Heather Somerville, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Pentagon Labeling Anthropic a Security Risk, Wall St. J. (Sep. 25, 2026, at 13:40 ET), https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-appeals-court-upholds-pentagon-labeling-anthropic-a-security-risk-9d08c3af?mod=article_inline (on file with the American University Business Law Review).

[6] See Anthropic PBC, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 29435, at *35–38 (distinguishing the broader language of FASCSA from § 3252); 41 U.S.C. § 4713(k)(6) (defining supply chain risk as the risk that “any person” may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, extract data, or otherwise manipulate covered articles); 10 U.S.C. § 3252(d)(4) (defining supply chain risk as the risk that “an adversary” may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert a covered system).

[7] See Anthropic PBC, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 29435, at *35–40; Amy L. Fuentes et al., D.C. Circuit Upholds Exclusion of Anthropic from DOW Supply Chain Under FASCSA, Holland & Knight (Sep. 29, 2026), https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/09/dc-circuit-upholds-exclusion-of-anthropic-from-dow-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/7STL-VBVK] (explaining that the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation permits exclusion under FASCSA even where the narrower § 3252 framework may not apply).

[8] See Anthropic PBC v. United States Dep’t of War, No. 26-cv-01996, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194178, at *1, *49 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2026).

[9] Aron C. Beezley & William B. Stupski, Anthropic v. DoW: What the Ruling Means for Government Contractors, Bradley: GovCon Source, (Aug. 31, 2026), https://www.govconsourceblog.com/2026/08/anthropic-v-dow-what-the-ruling-means-for-government-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/XF9P-2K4C].

[10] See Anthropic PBC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194178, at *54 (describing the comments made by Anthropic and the DoW’s response).

[11] See id. at *80–90.

[12] See Anthropic PBC, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 29435, at *1, *4–5; Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-390, 132 Stat. 5150 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 4713).

[13] See Anthropic PBC, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 29435, at *23 (describing the record’s support of the Secretary’s conclusion).

[14] See id. at *39–40 (explaining the statutory canons).

[15] See id. at *35–39.

[16] See id.; Manning, supra note 2; 41 U.S.C. § 4713 (explaining how a company is designated as a supply chain risk and the corresponding government authority); 10 U.S.C. § 3252 (describing the authority of a covered agency head to a covered procurement action).

[17] See Fuentes et al., supra note 7 (discussing the implications of the D.C. Circuit decision).

[18] Id.

[19] Ramkumar & Somerville, supra note 5.

[20] See Manning, supra note 2.

[21] Fuentes et al., supra note 7.

[22] See id.

[23] See Michael W. Mutek & Christopher L. Lockwood, Anthropic Litigation Creates Uncertain Compliance Landscape for Government Contractors, Womble Bond Dickinson (Aug. 26, 2026), https://www.womblebonddickinson.com/us/insights/digital-solutions/102nquu/anthropic-litigation-creates-uncertain-compliance-landscape-for-government-contra [https://perma.cc/78WB-WLZ8] (describing the impact of the litigation between Anthropic and the government).

[24] See Michael W. Mutek & Christopher L. Lockwood, D.C. Circuit Upholds Anthropic FASCSA Designation and Endorses Broad Interpretation of Supply-Chain Risk, Womble Bond Dickinson (Oct. 9, 2026), https://www.womblebonddickinson.com/us/insights/insights/102o52j/d-c-circuit-upholds-anthropic-fascsa-designation-and-endorses-broad-interpretati [https://perma.cc/2NWZ-22GG]; Burke Kappler, D.C. Circuit’s Anthropic Decision Expands the Range of Activities Constituting a “Supply Chain Risk” – and the Uncertainty to Contractors, Comput. & Commc’n Indus. Ass’n (Oct. 2, 2026), https://ccianet.org/articles/d-c-circuits-anthropic-decision-expands-the-range-of-activities-constituting-a-supply-chain-risk-and-the-uncertainty-to-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/Y28Z-CKR3].

[25] Kappler, supra note 24.

[26] See Robyn N. Burrows, Michael J. Montalbano & Justin A. Chiarodo, D.C. Circuit Upholds the Anthropic Ban: What it Means for Federal Contractors, BlankRome, (Sep. 28, 2026), https://governmentcontractsnavigator.com/2026/09/28/d-c-circuit-upholds-the-anthropic-ban-what-it-means-for-federal-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/LV3Y-E5BM] (discussing the implications to government contractors of the D.C. Circuit decision).

[27] Kappler, supra note 24.

[28] Burrows, supra note 26.

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