By: Lauren E. Smith

In Braham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,[1] the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted a preliminary injunction, allowing a former Junior College (“JUCO”) football player to continue playing Division I (“D1”) football despite the National Collegiate Athletics Association’s (“NCAA”) Five-Year Rule.[2]

This dispute unfolds against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in NCAA v. Alston,[3] which reshaped the NCAA; it was no longer “noncommercial.”[4] The introduction of name, image, and likeness (NIL) deals into college athletics made Division 1 football a billion-dollar market.[5] This new economic potential is leading athletes to challenge old eligibility rules as anticompetitive because playing D1 is not just about prestige anymore; it is about money.[6] As a commercial entity, the NCAA is now subject to antitrust scrutiny under the Sherman Act, which forbids unreasonable restraints of trade.[7]

Against this legal framework, Braham’s case arises. Braham started his collegiate career at a JUCO, and after transferring to a D1 school, had no remaining eligibility under NCAA policies to continue playing in the 2025-2026 football season.[8]  In his lawsuit, Braham argued that the NCAA’s Five-Year Rule has an anticompetitive effect on the D1 college football labor market because the rule primarily excludes JUCO players from access to NIL benefits.[9]

In granting Braham’s injunction, the district court assessed the likelihood that he would succeed on the merits of his claim.[10] In evaluating Braham’s likelihood of success, the Court first emphasized that the NCAA’s eligibility rules are competitive in nature, as the rules are so “intertwined” with the ability of student-athletes to receive compensation through NIL deals.[11] Because the eligibility rules are commercial, they are subject to antitrust scrutiny.[12] To succeed under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must prove that they participated in an agreement that unreasonably restrains trade in the relevant market.^[13] The Court found that the Five-Year-Rule had a substantial anticompetitive effect, “by excluding a qualified cohort—namely, JUCO athletes.”[14] This “disparate treatment of these two groups also results in a distortion of the labor market for NCAA Division I football players.”[15] Additionally, the Court found no pro-competitive justification for the Five-Year Rule.[16] They rejected the NCAA’s argument that it was necessary to protect collegiate athletics’ amateurism and “prevent age and experience disparities.”[17] In their justification, the Court reasoned that the rule does not restrict the eligibility of older students from “prep school, military service, and/or religious obligations,” and thus, mainly excluded former JUCO players.[18] Finally, the Court decided any potential pro-competitive justifications for the Five-Year Rule could be achieved through less restrictive means, such as starting the eligibility clock when a player joins an NCAA member institution.[19]

While this is not a final ruling on the merits, the Court granted Braham’s injunction based on its likelihood of success.[20] This decision greatly impacts college sports in three ways: 1) the characterization of NCAA policies as commercial; 2) the denial of the NCAA’s pro-competitive justifications; and 3) the Court’s willingness to subject college eligibility restrictions to antitrust scrutiny. By recognizing the NCAA’s role as the gatekeeper of NIL deals and professional success, this ruling increased athletes’ economic rights and weakened the NCAA’s regulatory authority, paving the way for more athletes to challenge the NCAA’s policies in the future. Moreover, this decision is not limited to football players; it will also affect other revenue-generating sports, such as baseball and basketball. Moving forward, athletes will be emboldened to advocate for their rights as potential earners, and courts are more likely to recognize them. Importantly, this decision evens the playing field for former JUCO players, giving them the same earning opportunities as their four-year program counterparts.

 

[1] No. 3:25-cv-00253-MMD-CSD, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137047, at *1-2 (D. Nev. July 18, 2025).

[2] Id. at *6 (explaining the NCAA’s Five-Year Rule limits collegiate athletes’ eligibility to four seasons of competition within a five-year window beginning from their full-time enrollment in a collegiate program, which includes any NCAA four-year member institution or two-year community college).

[3] 594 U.S. 69 (2021) (holding that the NCAA is subject to antitrust law and that restrictions on education-related compensation for student-athletes violated the Sherman Act, signaling the end of the NCAA’s immunity defense and paving the way for NIL contracts).

[4] Id. at 106.

[5] Kaleb Davis, NIL Deals: How College Athleticism is Reshaping the Economy, Glob. Edge (Mar. 25, 2025, 1:14 PM) https://globaledge.msu.edu/blog/post/59501/nil-deals–how-college-athleticism-is-reshaping-the-economy#:~:text= [https://perma.cc/8AE3-UXBL].

[6] Braham, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137047, at *11 (recognizing the change in “market realities” from NIL deals post-Alston as the impetus for new antitrust challenges).

[7] Id. at *12 (finding that the NCAA eligibility rules fall under the purview of the Sherman Act, and to succeed, a plaintiff must first show that a defendant “(1) participated in an agreement that (2) unreasonably restrain[s] trade in the relevant market.”).

[8] Id. at *4-5.

[9] Id. at *15 (arguing that restraining eligibility directly harms consumers (i.e., football players) in the relevant market by preventing access to NIL benefits).

[10] Id. at *9-10.

[11] Id. at *11 (explaining that an athlete’s ability to compete directly impacts their ability to receive compensation).

[12] Id. at *12.

[13] Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (asserting every contract in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States is declared to be illegal).

[14] Braham, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137047, at *15.

[15] Id.

[16] Id. at *16-17.

[17] Id. at *18.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. at *19 (excluding two-year Junior College institutions).

[20] Id. at *29.